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2Abstract 
 
If the demand for credit by the poor changes little when interest rates increase, lenders 
can raise fees to cost-covering levels without losing customers.  This claim is at the core 
of sustainable microfinance strategies that aim to provide banking services to the poor 
while eschewing long-term subsidies, but, so far, there is little direct evidence of this.  
This paper uses data from SafeSave, a credit cooperative in the slums of Dhaka, 
Bangladesh, to examine how sensitive borrowers are to increases in the interest rate on 
loans.  Using unanticipated between-branch variation in the interest rate we estimate 
interest elasticities of loan demand ranging from -0.73 to -1.04. Less wealthy 
accountholders are more sensitive to the interest rate than (relatively) wealthier 
borrowers (an elasticity of -0.86 compared to -0.26), and consequently the bank’s 
portfolio shifts away from its poorest borrowers when it increases the interest rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Do Interest Rates Matter? Credit Demand in the Dhaka Slums* 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The advent of microfinance lending in the last two decades has been hailed as a key 
development in the fight against poverty.  The New York Times (1997) editorial page, for 
example, has promoted microfinance as “a much-needed revolution” and “the world’s hot 
idea for reducing poverty,” and the United Nations General Assembly recognized the 
trend by marking 2005 as the International Year of Microcredit.  Microfinance involves 
new banking institutions that work in poor communities, aiming to achieve both financial 
viability and transformational social impacts.  New credit contracts have led to 
surprisingly high loan repayment rates (most established microlenders can claim 
repayment rates well above 95 percent), and economists have focused on the way that 
the contracts mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard, problems that undermined 
alternative attempts to lend to poor households without collateral (e.g., Stiglitz, 1990; 
Laffont and Rey, 2003; Rai and Sjöström, 2003).1   
But high repayment rates are insufficient to drive a revolution.  The key to the 
expansion of microfinance globally, it is argued, depends on the success of microfinance 
as a commercial phenomenon, free from subsidy (Drake and Rhyne, 2002; Robinson, 
2001).  The promise hinges as much (or more) on the ability to contain costs and to price 
loans at interest rates that are high enough to generate profits.  Once profitability is in 
hand, microlenders can expand globally with minimal external support. The logic of this 
part of the microfinance revolution is built on the idea that poor households are willing 
and able to pay interest rates for loans that fully cover the costs of lenders.  A corollary 
of this logic is that the poorest borrowers, who also tend to be the most expensive to 
serve, will pay the highest prices for capital.  
Implicit in this argument is a key – and untested – assumption: that poor 
households of the kind that take advantage of microfinance are not very responsive to 
changes in interest rates.  Specifically, it is argued that poor households primarily seek 
access to credit, not necessarily “cheap” credit.  When poor households are not very 
sensitive to price changes, prices can be raised without fear of losing the core customer 
base and suffering from mission drift.2  When that is so, microfinance institutions can 
offer credit at a sufficiently high interest rate to cover their operating costs and at the 
same time not merely skim the cream by appealing only to the most eligible borrowers. 
In this paper, we test this something-for-nothing view.  We take advantage of an 
unexpected price increase imposed by a lender in the slums of Dhaka to examine the 
degree to which poor households reduce their borrowing when faced with a higher 
interest rate.   
                                                 
* We are very grateful for access to data from SafeSave, Dhaka.  Stuart Rutherford, Mark Staehle, and the 
senior staff of SafeSave have been very generous with their time in answering questions about the data and 
product rules.  Elvira Kurmanalieva provided expert research assistance in Tokyo, and Sarojini Hirshleifer 
helped with the industry-level microfinance data.  We have benefited from comments from Jonathan Zinman, 
David Porteus, and seminar participants at Columbia. We take all responsibility for the analyses and any 
errors. 
1 The July 2003 Microbanking Bulletin provides the highest quality data available, covering 124 leading 
microlenders.  Their average portfolio at risk greater than 30 days is 2.8 percent. 
2 This argument has held greater force in Latin America and Africa, where microfinance interest rates have 
tended to be higher, than in South Asia, where fears are more often expressed that high interest rates will 
deter promising clients and diminish social and economic impacts on households. 
4Other than Karlan and Zinman (2005), we know of no other econometric 
estimates of interest elasticities for customers in the microfinance market.3  The main 
methodological difficulty is that the schedule of interest rates seldom varies within a 
given program, and, when it does change, it does so for everyone across the board.  
Thus it is typically impossible to disentangle the effect of the interest rate change from 
broader changes occurring simultaneously (e.g., macroeconomic shocks).  It may be 
possible to compare clients of different institutions who face different interest rates at 
any given moment, but then researchers face the question of why some customers 
selected one institution and why others selected another.  It is also difficult to 
disentangle the effects of non-price differences among programs.   
We use the administrative records of SafeSave, an innovative microfinance 
institution operating in the slums of Dhaka, to address this question. Identification is 
based on unanticipated between-branch variation in the interest rate. At the time of our 
study, SafeSave operated three urban branches, with slightly different products and 
prices in one of the branches.  By comparing times at which product rules changed in 
two locations but not in the third, we can make inferences about the sensitivity of 
customer behavior to interest rates. The SafeSave data allow a clean comparison based 
on an unexpected policy change made within a single institution that maintains a uniform 
philosophy and operating protocol throughout. 
Our results suggest that borrowers are in fact highly sensitive to interest rate 
changes.  After controlling for generally upward trends in loan demand, the implied 
elasticities of loan demand with respect to changes in the interest rate are in the 
range -0.73 to -0.88, with estimates as low as -1.04.  We also find that less wealthy 
households (as measured by initial savings balances) are particularly sensitive to the 
interest rate increase (an elasticity of -0.86 compared to -0.26), and consequently that 
the bank’s portfolio shifted slightly away from its poorest borrowers when it increased the 
interest rate.  The rate increase helped SafeSave to improve its financial condition, but 
not without a cost in terms of outreach to the poorest clients. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the prior literature and 
debates on interest rates. Section 3 provides details on SafeSave. Section 4 
summarizes our data. Section 5 outlines our identification strategy. Section 6 presents 
results on the interest elasticity of loan demand. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Interest Rate Debates 
 
The assumption of inelastic demand for capital is a radical break from past thinking.  In 
the 1970s and 1980s, usury laws were common, and they restricted interest rates on 
loans to low levels.  These caps were often combined with directives on who should get 
subsidized loans and for what purpose.4  The laws were driven by the belief that high 
                                                 
3 Gross and Souleles (2002) provide estimates of the sensitivity of credit card customers in the United 
States to interest rate changes.  Their findings are in the same range as ours.  They find that the long-run (at 
the end of one year) elasticity of debt to the interest rate is -1.3, which is greater (in absolute value) than our 
estimates, but they find a smaller (in absolute value) elasticity for interest rate increases than decreases.  
Under half of their elasticity comes from shifting balances between accounts and the rest is from reduction in 
total debt.   Karlan and Zinman (2005) provide interesting evidence that relates to the question here, finding 
that a one percentage point per month increase in the stated interest rate for loans (offered in a direct mail 
solicitation letter by a bank in South Africa) reduces the take-up of the solicitation by -0.3 percentage points 
(from an average take-up rate of 7 percent).  
4 See, for example, the critical discussion in Adams, et al (1984).  Homer and Sylla (1996) document how 
attitudes toward interest rate restrictions have swung widely through time.  They begin with Hammurabi, 
King of Babylonia in about 1800 B.C., who restricted interest rates on grain loans (to be repaid in kind) to 33 
1/3 percent per year.  Rates on loans in silver could be no higher than 20 percent per year.  The ancient 
5interest rates on working capital would consume most of the surpluses generated by 
small-scale entrepreneurs, leaving borrowers with little net gain.  In Brazil in the early 
1970s, for example, interest rates on loans for working capital were fixed at 17 percent 
per year while inflation rates ranged from 20 to 40 percent per year.5   Even where 
interest rate caps allowed positive real interest rates, they were seldom high enough to 
permit banks to cover costs.  As a result, lending to the poor was a heavily-subsidized 
activity, monopolized by state-run banks.  Too often, the subsidized resources went to 
non-poor households and political elites.  Financial services tended to be low-quality, 
and scale was constrained by the size of government budgets.6 
Microfinance advocates challenge the assumptions upon which the state-
subsidized banks were built.  Most microfinance interest rates now fall between 30 
percent and 60 percent per year (in places where inflation runs no higher than 10 
percent per year).  Figure 1 shows the range of costs charged by over 100 leading 
microlenders, averaged by countries.  The figure gives real portfolio yields (calculated 
as the financial revenue from the loan portfolio as a fraction of the average gross loan 
portfolio, adjusted for inflation).  The portfolio yields thus give average effective interest 
rates charged on loans, together with any extra loan-related service charges.  The 
figures range from 0 percent at the bottom (for a single lender in Yugoslavia) to over 70 
percent at the top, with a median of 30 percent; the 25th percentile has a real interest 
rate of 20 percent per year while the 75th percentile has a rate of 47 percent per year. 
Donors who are shaping microfinance policy have spent much effort making the 
argument that raising real interests to 50 percent and higher is unlikely, in fact, to 
dissuade credit-worthy borrowers.  The assertion stems from two ideas.  The first is that 
marginal returns to capital diminish with scale.  If that is so, poor borrowers who are 
starved for capital ought to have high marginal returns to their investments—and ought 
to be willing to pay high interest rates as a result (Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor, 1996).  The second idea is that poor households already pay very high interest 
rates to moneylenders (often 100 percent per year or more), so that if poor households 
can keep moneylenders in business, it should be no surprise that loans at half the 
moneylender rate are welcomed.  Influential advocates now argue that poor 
households are so insensitive to interest rates that the standard practice ought to be to 
set fees high enough that institutions generate profits, cutting donors out of the loop 
after a short period of start-up subsidies.7  If this is so, microfinance can readily expand 
to serve the hundreds of millions of currently excluded households, without sacrificing 
depth of outreach.  
 This claim is far from clear as a general proposition.  First, the assumption of 
diminishing marginal returns to capital disregards the possibility of non-convexities in 
production processes and unequal access to non-capital inputs like managerial skills 
and human capital.  Moreover, raising interest rates can in principle exacerbate moral 
hazard and adverse selection, worsening loan repayment rates and screening out the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Greeks did away with restrictions under Solon’s rule, but the Romans brought them back, limiting charges 
on loans to 8 1/3 percent per year.  Charlemagne forbade all interest, a view continued by most theologians 
in the Middle Ages, only to be undone in northern Europe with the Reformation.  England continued without 
restrictions, while in the contemporary United States individual states set limits on interest rates on personal 
loans at around 30-45 percent per year.  In developing countries today, interest rate restrictions remain the 
norm, and in many cases special laws have had to be written to give microlenders the leeway needed to 
work in poor communities while covering costs.   
5 Sayad (1983, p. 381). 
6 The phenomenon is part of a broader problem of financial repression as described by McKinnon (1973). 
7 The argument often invokes a simple version of the idea of diminishing marginal returns to capital (e.g., 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest, 1996).   
6most reliable borrowers.8  And, while microlenders may still find a pool of customers after 
real interest rates are raised, the customers may not be from the same pool that was 
willing and able to pay the lower rates.  Fears like these, coupled with a strongly-felt 
moral imperative to keep costs as low as possible for the poor, have compelled the 
larger microlenders in Bangladesh to keep real interest rates below 40 percent per year, 
even if it means turning to subsidized resources to cover costs (e.g., Morduch, 1999).  
Figure 1 shows that the average fees charged by two large lenders in Bangladesh are 
just under 30 percent.  The Grameen Bank (which is not one of the two) keeps their 
interest rates and fees close to 20 percent per year (nominal) on their main lending 
products—and they deflect suggestions to raise rates.  Figure 2 shows differences in 
real interest rates across continents, with South Asia at the low end.  Figure 3 shows 
that institutions serving the poorest customers tend also to charge higher interest rates 
and face higher costs relative to lenders serving clients upmarket.  
 
3. The SafeSave Program 
 
 About one third of Dhaka’s 11 million people live in slums. Most adult slum 
residents are poor but working, finding informal sector jobs such as being a driver, 
domestic help, or construction worker.  Some find work in factories, particularly in the 
garment industry.  The slums have active economies of their own, but they are poorly 
served by formal financial intermediaries.  Instead, traditional means of saving and 
borrowing, like joining rotating saving and credit associations (ROSCAs) or finding a 
friend willing to serve as a “money guard”, are common ways to manage funds.9  
 SafeSave was launched in 1996 with the mission of offering its clients “the most 
convenient possible way to turn their savings into usefully large sums of money.”10  To 
do this, SafeSave clients are served by “collectors” who visit them in their homes or 
businesses six days a week.  Each day, clients can choose to add to their savings, pay 
down loans, or to draw down their savings, in amounts that are variable and freely 
chosen.  Clients must visit the branch office only to withdraw more than 500 taka in a 
day or to get a loan. Once clients obtain a loan, they can pay it back on their own 
schedule – in small frequent bits, in a lump sum, quickly, or stretched out over time.  The 
only stipulation is that interest on the outstanding balance must be paid each month.  
The program thus combines the convenience of a ROSCA with the flexibility that a bank 
can offer.  While borrowers are required to hold savings accounts, savers are not 
required to borrow; at any time, about two thirds of clients hold loans.  None of the loans 
require assets to be pledged as collateral, although, as we describe below, a form of 
“financial collateral” is employed.11 
The first branches were in western Dhaka. Apart from residence in the slum, 
there are no additional eligibility requirements or means tests.  The first branches served 
were in Tikkapara and Kalyanpur, a mix of densely-populated slums where squatters live 
in rows of lightweight huts built on bamboo frames, with woven bamboo walls and, in 
better circumstances, tin roofs.  The third branch was opened in Geneva slum, a 
community of Bihari refugees with government-provided concrete housing along a grid of 
                                                 
8 The arguments are reviewed in Armendariz and Morduch (2005).  McKenzie and Woodruff (2003) give 
evidence from Mexico that shows no signs of non-convexities in production for small-scale entrepreneurs. 
9 Rutherford (1997) describes a survey of informal finance in the Dhaka slums.  Half of the sample, collected 
from financial diaries described in Rutherford (2004), is from the Dhaka slums.  Both studies provide rich 
data on a relatively small sample.  In contrast, the present study takes advantage of a large sample but just 
a limited number of variables. 
10 The quote is taken from www.safesave.org in April 2004. 
11 Armendariz and Morduch (2005) describe the use of financial collateral and its rationale. 
7narrow lanes.  The analysis below compares interest rate changes in Tikkapara and 
Kalyanpur to ongoing conditions in Geneva. 
 
4. The Data 
 
After making their daily rounds to the homes and businesses of their customers, the 
records of SafeSave collectors are entered into database software for use by 
management.  We use the daily data to calculate basic measures of saving and 
borrowing and then aggregate them to the monthly level.  Most of the variation in loan 
balances occurs between months, rather than within, so little relevant information was 
sacrificed through aggregation.  In addition to financial variables, we also know the 
customers’ ages, gender, and length of time with the bank.  Given the long time-series 
dimension, we can control for time invariant unobservables using fixed effects. 
Most of the analysis focuses on 68,037 month-customer observations between 
January 1999 and January 2001.  They reflect data on 5,147 customers, not all of whom 
are part of the program during the entire period.  The change in the interest rate occurs 
midway through the sample, in February 2000.  
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the sample, restricted to the dates we 
study.  Two thirds of the clients are women (or girls), with an average age in the late 
twenties.  The financial data show that in all three branches, monthly deposits to savings 
are small, averaging about 55 taka (or $2.53 in January 2000 US dollars).  In Tikkapara 
and Kalyanpur, which had started several years before Geneva, accumulated savings 
balances averaged 579 taka (or $26), while in Geneva the average savings balance was 
217 taka (or $10).  Average loan sizes are small relative to those from other 
microlenders (at 1051 taka, or $48, in Tikkapara and Kalyanpur and 891 taka, or $37, in 
Geneva). Loan balances (which reflect partial repayments) are similar in the branches – 
about 434 taka ($20) in Tikkapara and Kalyanpur and 480 taka (or $22) in Geneva. The 
typical length of a loan cycle is short, approximately one month between the time a loan 
is taken and repaid. Each repayment is relatively small, 200 taka (or $9.25) in Tikkapara 
and Kalyanpur and 405 taka (or $18.66) in Geneva, corresponding on average to 
repaying a quarter of the loan each week or half every two weeks. 
 
5. Estimation and Identification 
 
Identification of the impact of the February 2000 interest rate increase (from 2 percent 
per month to 3 percent per month) exploits the fact that the change occurred in 
Tikkapara and Kalyanpur branches, but not in Geneva Branch.  Geneva had already 
started with an interest rate of 3 percent per month when it opened in March 1999.   
Identification hinges on the presumed lack of correlation of the timing of the 
interest rate change with other events occurring in Tikkapara and Kalyanpur.  Based on 
interviews with the bank, the timing of the switch seems to have been both arbitrary and 
unexpected.12 Contemporaneous changes that occur in all three branches will be 
controlled for through the inclusion of data from Geneva branch and the estimation of 
baseline trends using those data. 
This setup suggests a difference-in-difference estimator, although there is one 
feature that merits particular attention here.  Unlike a situation in which customers move 
from one equilibrium to another with little else in the environment changing but the price, 
                                                 
12 As Stuart Rutherford, the founder of SafeSave, remembers the switch: “It was fairly arbitrary… I don't 
think there was anything special about February 2000 - it is just that by then the pro-rise argument finally 
prevailed in the discussions that I had with [the senior staff].” Email correspondence, March 6, 2005. 
8here customers are steadily building up savings and the capacity to borrow.  New 
customers are also joining, and some older customers are beginning to depart.  Because 
we have records for all customers, past and present, concern with attrition is limited 
here, but we pay close attention to the underlying upward trends in borrowing and 
saving.  It is against those trends that we see a reduction of demand for borrowing.  The 
net effect we will find is a slowing down in the rate of borrowing in the year following the 
interest rate increase. 
The basic trends can be seen in Figure 4, which gives average monthly loan 
balances in Geneva Branch versus Tikkapara and Kalyanpur combined.  Since Geneva 
started only in March 1999, we find a steady rise from zero upward, whereas growth in 
the other two branches starts at a higher level and flattens in the middle of the period.  
The vertical line marks January 2000, the month prior to the interest rate increase. It is 
notable that in 1999 both groups have a similar, linear trend. This suggests that the 
differences-in-differences assumption is plausible. Hence, we begin with a simple 
difference-in-difference specification: 
 yit =  β0 + β1 Treatedi + β2 Postt + β3 Treatedi×Postt + εit (1) 
where: i indexes clients and t the month; yit is the dependent variable (typically average 
monthly loan balances, but also an indicator for loans, amount loaned, and repayments); 
Treatedi takes on a value of 1 for individuals in Tikkapara and Kalyanpur and 0 for those 
in Geneva; and Postt refers to time periods after the interest rate increase. Hence, β3 
gives the impact of the interest rate increase: the change in borrowing before and after 
the interest rate increase in Tikkapara and Kalyanpur, relative to the contemporaneous 
change in Geneva. 
We proceed to refine this estimation strategy along a number of dimensions. 
First, we control for borrower characteristics, including age and length of time in the 
program. Second, rather than simply controlling for time effects with a before-versus-
after dummy, we include a full set of month-year dummies. Third, we include account 
fixed effects; this then controls for all non-time-varying differences among borrowers. 
Fourth, we allow for trend differences between the treated and comparison groups, in 
addition to a shift in the level of borrowing. Finally, the basic setup is expanded to 
consider the heterogeneity of responses (along dimensions such as gender, wealth, and 
age). 
We extend these results with an alternative specification that uses knowledge of 
SafeSave’s product rules to control for credit supply. In particular, we use the exact 
formula used by SafeSave to determine and control for an individual’s maximum 
borrowing capacity. For example, in Tikkapara and Kalyanpur, borrowers are not allowed 
to borrow until they have been customers for at least two months and their savings have 
reached 500 taka (just under $10 in January 2000).13  At that point they can borrow their 
saving balance plus 1000 taka.  The next time, they can increase the loan size by 
another 500 taka, and so on, without limit, adding another 500 taka to their credit limit 
with each successive cycle.  (The exact rules are in the appendix.) 
This is an important advantage of the data we are using because individuals 
might respond differently to changes in the interest rate based on their ability to borrow. 
For example, individuals with low (or zero) borrowing capacity cannot significantly 
respond to changes in interest rates. Since borrowing capacity hinges in part on savings 
behavior, and since savings behavior is likely to be jointly determined with borrowing, 
there is a fear that simultaneity and, possibly, omitted variables will bias the results.  We 
thus instrument for capacity using the length of time the accountholder has been with the 
bank. Time in program is a valid instrument for capacity under three assumptions, all of 
                                                 
13 On January 1, 2000, US$1 = 50.9 taka.  So 500 taka is $9.83. 
9which seem reasonable for our data: exogeneity (since time in program increases 
linearly it is unlikely to be correlated with simultaneous shocks to borrowing and saving), 
relevance (the longer individuals are in the program typically the more savings they 
accumulate), and exclusion (assuming we have correctly computed borrowing capacity, 
which is reasonable since we observe all the information that the bank does, then the 
only reason that time in program should affect borrowing is through savings and in turn 
capacity). 
  
6. Results 
 
6.1 Diffs-in-diffs and fixed effects 
The first column of Table 2 gives the results of a simple difference in loan balances 
before and after the interest rate increase in Tikkapara and Kalyanpur. The coefficient is 
positive, reflecting the upward trend in overall loan balances (as seen in Figure 4). The 
basic differences-in-differences estimator (column 2) uses Geneva to estimate and 
subtract off this trend; the net impact of the interest rate increase is a 136 taka reduction 
in loan demand.  The impact is small (the implied elasticity is -0.25) but, given the large 
sample size, statistically significant. 
 The interest rate elasticity falls (to -0.29) once customer age and their time with 
the bank are included as controls in the third column. The fourth column increases the 
flexibility of the specification by allowing for a full set of month-year dummy variables.  
The ability to better control for underlying trends lowers the interest rate elasticity further, 
to -0.39. 
 Few controls for heterogeneity in customer tastes and constraints are available in 
the data, but the long time series dimension of the panel allows precise estimation of 
account fixed effects.  Adding controls for account fixed effects in column 5 absorbs a 
significant amount of variation (the R-squared increases from 0.13 to 0.69) and reduces 
the interest rate elasticity to -0.73.  The next two columns show that the elasticities are in 
a similar range when estimated for Tikkapara (-0.86) and Kalyanpur (-0.70) separately. 
The eighth column of Table 2 allows the estimated impacts to vary by month; we see 
that the immediate responsiveness is small (an elasticity of -0.18), but increases 
substantially over time (to -1.18 a year after the change).  The ninth column allows 
trends in Tikkapara and Kalyanpur to differ from Geneva’s base trend both before and 
after the interest rate change (we retain the differential intercepts of the standard diffs-in-
diffs model, in addition to account fixed effects). The treatment effect in this model is 
both the shift in the intercept and the differential trend associated with being in Tikkapara 
or Kalyanpur in the months after the interest rate increase.  The average elasticity in this 
specification is -0.72, which is in the same range as the previous results. 
 The panel used above is not balanced: customers enter the program at different 
points and some exit before January 2001.  One concern is that the changing mix of 
customers over time affects the results.  So, in column 10, we restrict attention to a 
balanced panel made up of customers who are in the panel for at least six months prior 
to the February 2000 interest rate increase.  These estimates from the balanced panel 
yield similar results to the base specification in column 5; the estimated interest rate 
elasticity is -0.79. 
 Finally, it is worth noting that our elasticity calculations are based on the change 
in loan balances relative to loans in the initial period. Given the upward trend in loan 
balances this could overstate the responsiveness of loans to changes in the interest 
rate. When we recompute our baseline elasticity (-0.73 in column 5) using an arc 
elasticity (averaged between March 2000 and January 2001), the estimated elasticity 
decreases only slightly, to -0.68, which does not qualitatively affect our results. 
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6.2 Heterogeneous effects 
In this subsection we examine the heterogeneity of our main result along three 
dimensions: estimation window, lower wealth versus higher wealth, and borrowing 
capacity. 
 
6.2.1 Estimation window 
We begin by examining how the choice of estimation window affects our results. In our 
main results, we include the period 12 months before and after the change in interest 
rates. The concern is that with a longer estimation window trends in the data could be 
driving the results. Thus in Table 3, columns 1 and 2, we narrow the window to nine 
months and to three months before and after the policy change. Dropping the last three 
months of our sample is useful because of the apparent increase in the growth of loans 
seen in Tikkapara and Kalyanpur in Figure 4 at the end of the sample period. For the 
narrower window, the estimated elasticity is -0.7, similar to our baseline estimate. In 
column 2, for the narrowest window, the estimated responsiveness is smaller, though 
still negative and significant at standard levels. The elasticity in this specification is -0.37. 
 
6.2.2 Lower-wealth versus higher-wealth borrowers 
In the next three columns, we investigate how wealth affects the impact of interest rates 
on loan balances. Without a comprehensive measure of wealth, we turn to data on 
average saving balances.  In column 3, the sample is restricted to households who did 
not save at least 100 taka during one of the months between June 1999 and August 
1999,14 and the estimation window is restricted to October 1999 to January 2001.  
Column 4 considers households who saved over 100 taka during any month in the June 
to August period.  The estimates show that the “low-saving” group is more responsive to 
the interest rate than the “high-saving” group, with an elasticity of -0.86 compared to -
0.26.  We conclude that the composition of SafeSave’s loan portfolio shifted toward 
(relatively) wealthier clients compared to the composition before the increase. 
 We examine this effect directly in column 5 where we estimate the effect of the 
interest rate change on size of loans taken by poor borrowers. We use a triple-
differences estimator: we are comparing the growth in the amount loaned to the poor 
relative to the rich in Tikkapara and Kalyanpur, before and after the interest rate 
increase, subtracting out the same difference from Geneva to control for the time trend. 
We find that there was a 250 taka decrease in the typical size of loan taken by poor 
borrowers because of the interest rate change, a decrease of 12 percent relative to the 
mean. Note that the decrease in amount loaned is relative to Geneva. In absolute terms, 
the amount loaned to the poor relative to the rich decreased in Tikkapara and Kalyanpur 
by 624 taka, compared to a decrease of 373 in Geneva over the same period. 
 We also explored possible differences in responsiveness by gender and age (in 
specifications not reported here), but do not find substantial differences in estimated 
elasticities. 
 
6.2.3 Borrowing capacity 
Table 2 presented a range of estimates of the change in loan balances in response to 
changes in the interest rate. Though these estimates account for time trends, time 
effects more flexibly, and observed and unobserved individual characteristics, the 
                                                 
14 Alternative definitions, based on cash inflows (did the customer make deposits or repay loans in amounts 
that together totaled 200 taka or more in any of the months between June and August 1999?) and on 
average savings balances, yield very similar results. 
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estimates do not account for variation in borrowing capacity. In particular, individuals 
with low borrowing capacity are less able to respond to changes in interest rates than 
individuals with higher capacity (this is most transparent for individuals with zero 
borrowing capacity). In columns 6 and 7 we address this by taking advantage of our 
knowledge of the rules used by SafeSave to determine the maximum loan capacity of 
borrowers (the rules are detailed in the appendix).     
 Column 6 introduces capacity as a control in our main specification. The 
estimated interest-rate responsiveness and elasticity are somewhat greater than our 
baseline result, -0.88 compared to -0.73. The coefficient on capacity is 0.2, which 
suggests that households increase their borrowing by only 20 percent of an increase in 
borrowing capacity. 
 However, measurement error, simultaneity, and omitted variable bias with 
respect to the capacity measure are serious concerns. Though in principle we measure 
borrowing capacity precisely, there is always scope for some variation in a branch’s loan 
decision. There is also a serious concern of simultaneity. A common shock could drive 
both savings (which is the most important component of capacity) and borrowing. In 
particular, the presumption is that a negative shock would decrease savings and 
increase the demand for loans, potentially biasing our results downward. Finally, 
borrowing capacity is determined mostly by savings, which could affect the demand for 
loans for reasons other than borrowing capacity. 
We address all of these concerns by instrumenting for loan capacity using the 
length of time the individual has been in the program. As discussed in Section 5, time in 
program plausibly satisfies the key requirements for a valid instrumental variable.  
Results are presented in column 7. We note that the F-statistic of the instrument in the 
first stage is reasonably high (10.75). The estimated effect of interest rates on borrowing 
increases in absolute value. The implied interest rate elasticity is now -1.04, the lowest 
elasticity that we find in any specification. 
 
6.3 Mechanisms 
Several mechanisms could account for our results:  reductions in the probability of taking 
loans, reductions in the size of those loans, increased speed in repaying loans, or some 
combination of these.  In Table 4 we examine each of these outcomes using our base 
specification. 
In column 1 we begin by considering a linear probability model where the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether the borrower takes a loan in a given 
month.  We find a five percentage point increase in the probability of taking a loan. If 
borrowers are taking more loans, but average loan balances are decreasing, it would 
suggest either that the size of loans is decreasing or that repayment rates are 
accelerating. Columns 2, 3, and 4 show that both of these are the case. We find that the 
amount borrowed decreases by about 17 percent relative to the typical loan size. For the 
amount repaid, we find an increase of approximately 100 taka, or 60 percent relative to 
the typical monthly repayment.  At the same time, the time between loans fell by about 
one month, suggesting that the interest rate increase induced borrowers to take more 
frequent, smaller loans and to repay them more quickly than before. 
The fifth column shows that, as expected, withdrawals from savings accounts 
rise, to compensate for the decrease in borrowing.  Deposits also fall, but the coefficient 
is small and not statistically significant. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
We have examined the widely held view that the loan elasticity of demand in 
microfinance institutions is low. The goal of reaching as many unbanked customers as 
possible has pushed microlenders to pursue profitability. Once profitable, microlenders 
can expand as far as the market will allow, without concern for the availability of funds 
from donors.  The natural fear, though, is that raising interest rates too high will erode 
surpluses generated by customers and reduce the demand for financial services, 
undermining the original intention of the push for microfinance.  This concern has, 
however, been largely ignored, with the argument that poor customers are apt to be 
insensitive to interest rates and have ample surpluses with which to pay cost-covering 
fees.  We examine this tradeoff in the context of SafeSave, a microfinance organization 
operating within the slums of Dhaka. 
Using between branch variation in interest rates we estimate elasticities in the 
range of approximately -0.73 to -1.04, with our preferred estimate being at the upper end 
of this range.  Though SafeSave did achieve financial stability as a result of the interest 
rate increase, our results also suggest that this came at a cost in terms of serving the 
bank’s poorest clients. The bank’s loan portfolio shifted toward relatively wealthier 
customers (albeit still poor in absolute terms) in the year after the interest rate increase, 
as compared to the expected composition of the portfolio without an interest rate 
change.    
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Appendix: 
 
SafeSave product rules15 
 
Product P2 
Offered in Tikkapara and Kalyanpur branches as of November 1997.  Not changed 
(except for the February 2000 interest rate rise on loans) until August 2003. 
 
Eligibility: Anyone in the slum including children (children allowed to borrow); multiple 
accounts per person allowed and per household allowed. 
 
Account Fees: no account opening, closing, or monthly fees. 
 
Savings: Deposit any sum any time; withdraw any sum any time unless a loan is held in 
which case no withdrawal allowed; interest paid in two ways (a) if account held for 5 
years, then 25 percent of final balance paid at the end of the term (provided certain 
safeguards against ‘end loading’ were satisfied) (b) if account closed before 5 years 
interest paid retrospectively at closure at 1 percent a month for accounts that attained 
and maintained 1000 balance. 
 
Loans: Account must be 2 months old and savings must have reached 500 before first 
loan; first loan = savings balance + 1000, subsequent loans savings balance + 1500, 
then savings balance + 2000, etc, no limit; disbursement fee of 100 for loans up to 5000, 
200 taka for bigger ones; interest charged monthly at 2 percent per month on 
outstanding balance at end of previous month; no fixed repayment schedule and no 
fixed term but a ‘renewal fee’ equal to the disbursement fee payable each 6 months. 
 
In February 2000, the interest rate on loans was raised from 2 percent to 3 percent per 
month; renewal fees set at 3 percent of outstanding balance (rather than as a set figure). 
 
Insurance: None. 
 
 
Product P3 
Only offered in Geneva branch. Introduced in March 1999 and not changed until August 
2003. 
 
 Eligibility: Anyone in the slum including children (children allowed to borrow); multiple 
accounts per person allowed and per household allowed. 
 
Account Fees: no account opening or closing fees, 10 taka monthly service fee. 
 
Savings: Two products: current and long-term, both optional. 
 
Current Savings: deposit any sum any time; withdraw any sum any time; no linkage with 
loans; interest paid on balances of 500 or more at 1 percent a month but no interest in 
months when withdrawals are made. 
 
                                                 
15 These rules were written by Stuart Rutherford.  Kalyanpur was originally served by the Tikkapara branch 
and became its own branch in September 1998.  The product rules were unchanged during the switch. 
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Long-term savings: a 60-month accumulating savings device, monthly deposits 50 or a 
multiple of 50; if terminated prematurely no interest is paid; after 60 months the client 
stops saving and interest is added at the same monthly deposit rate, so the longer the 
client holds the savings the more s/he receives and the higher the effective rate. 
 
Loans: Client must have held and paid into a long-term savings account for 2 months 
before a loan can be taken, and must be up-to-date with long-term savings to borrow; 
first loan value 1000 then rises in 1000 steps; maximum value cannot exceed the 
monthly long-term deposit x 100. Repay any time, any schedule; charge of 3 percent of 
loan when it is disbursed; interest paid monthly at 3 percent of previous month-end 
balance. 
 
Insurance: None.
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Figure 1: Real Yields on Gross Portfolio, Country averages 
MicroBanking Bulletin, July 2003 (n = 124) 
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Figure 2: Real Yields on Gross Portfolio, Region averages and maximums 
MicroBanking Bulletin, July 2003 (n = 124) 
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Figure 3: Total expense ratio and real gross portfolio yield,  
by target group 
MicroBanking Bulletin, July 2003 (n=124) 
 
 
  
 
Notes:  “Low-end” institutions include those with a ratio of average loan size to GNP per 
capita below 20 percent (or an average loan size under US$150).  For “broad” 
institutions, the ratio is between 20 percent and 149 percent, and for “high-end” 
institutions, it is between 150 percent and 249 percent.  The total expense ratio is the 
ratio of total expenses to assets.   
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Figure 4: Average loan balances, SafeSave 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Monthly averages, January 1999 – January 2001 
 
 Observations Mean 
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum 
 
Tikkapara and Kalyanpur  
Female 54,522 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Age 54,522 26.9 10.7 4 94 
Saving deposit 54,522 43.2 128 0 11675 
Positive saving deposit 36,358 65 152 0.42 11676 
Saving balance 54,522 579 978 0 30347 
Withdrawals 54,522 26.9 159 0 9823 
Loan (initial amount) 3,675 1384 729 424 6446 
Length of loan cycle 
(months) 54,522 0.81 1.13 0 10 
Loan balances 54,522 434 665 0 6501 
Positive loan balances 22,523 1051 650 0.22 6501 
Repayments 54,522 65.6 223 0 4772 
Positive repayments 17.813 201 353 0.43 4772 
      
Geneva      
Female 13,515 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Age 13,515 27.5 10.7 2 94 
Saving deposit 13,515 44.1 76.8 0 1880 
Positive saving deposit 11,848 50 80 0.42 1 
Saving balance 13,515 217 409 0 13803 
Long-term saving deposit 13,515 23.3 17.6 0 131 
Long-term saving balance 13,515 136 145 -85.8 1190 
Withdrawals 13,515 36.5 129 0 6489 
Loan (initial amount) 2,568 891 476 43 3393 
Length of loan cycle 
(months) 13,515 1.30 1.36 0 80 
Loan balances 13,515 480 545 0 3365 
Positive loan balances 7,956 816 481 3.16 3365 
Repayments 13,515 103 276 0 3887 
Positive repayments 3,443 405 421 2.15 3887 
 
Notes: Statistics calculated from SafeSave customer records and converted into 1985-
86 taka.  The urban price level had risen to 230.14 by January 2000, at which time 50.85 
taka could buy one dollar.  To convert the data into January 2000 dollars, divide by 22.1.  
In Geneva branch, customers could have both a regular saving account (with flexible 
deposits and withdrawals) and a long-term savings account with restricted withdrawals 
and a rigid monthly deposit requirement. 
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Table 2: Estimated Interest Rate Effects on Loan Balances 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Specification First 
difference 
Diffs in 
diffs 
Diffs in 
diffs 
Diffs in 
diffs 
Account 
FE 
Account FE Account 
FE  
Account FE Account FE Account FE, 
balanced 
panel 
Sample TI KA TI KA GE TI KAGE TI KA GE TI KA GE TI GE KA GE TI KA GE TI KA GE TI KA GE 
Time effects  Pre-post Pre-post Month-
year 
dummies
Month-
year 
dummies
Month- 
year 
dummies 
Month-
year 
dummies
Month-year 
dummies 
Linear trends 
TI+KA/ GE, 
m-y dummies
Month- 
year 
dummies 
Interest rate 300   -136** -156.7*** -209.0*** -388.5*** -461.0*** -374.4***  -207.9*** -421.6*** 
    increase (TI+KA 
    x post 02-2000) 
(31.6) (67) (16.5) (16.6) (11.8) (14.1) (11.8)  (18.2) (17.6) 
Geneva  -167*** 105.3*** 41.4***       
  (47.9) (15.3) (15.5)       
Post- 02-2002  325*** 196.6***        
  (47.9) (15.6)        
Age   1.9*** 1.9***       
   (0.2) (0.2)       
Time in program   23.9*** 23.0*** 54.0*** 59.1*** 54.6*** 53.3*** 37.2*** 52.2*** 
   (0.3) (0.3) (1.0) (1.4) (1.0) (2.4) (1.1) (1.5) 
Interest rate effects: 
    2-2000 
        
-134.3*** 
  
        (19.9)   
    3-2000        -187.7***   
        (19.0)   
    4-2000        -210.7***   
        (17.7)   
    5-2000        -256.7***   
        (17.0)   
    6-2000        -327.6***   
        (16.9)   
    7-2000        -404.3***   
        (16.7)   
    8-2000        -461.1***   
        (16.6)   
    9-2000        -514.7***   
        (16.5)   
  10-2000        -563.3***   
        (16.5)   
  11-2000        -603.8***   
        (16.6)   
  12-2000        -633.3***   
        (16.8)   
Time trend         6.9***  
         (2.2)  
TI +KA         -2.5  
    differential trend         (2.3)  
Post         9.2***  
    differential trend         (1.4)  
TI+KA+post          -28.8***  
    differential trend         (1.9)  
Constant  326*** 16.7**        
  (33.1) (7.5)        
Interest rate 
elasticity 
 -0.25 -0.29 -0.39 -0.73 -0.86 -0.70 (-0.25,-1.18) -0.72 -0.79 
Observations 56 56 68,037 68,037 68,037 24,759 56,793 68,037 68,037 43,237 
R-squared 0.63 0.62 0.12 0.13 0.69 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.69 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent
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Table 3: Heterogeneity of Estimated Interest Rate Effects on Loan Balances 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (cut) (6) (7) 
Outcome Loan 
balances 
Loan 
balances 
Loan 
balances 
Loan 
balances 
Amount 
loaned to 
poor 
Loan 
balances 
Loan 
balances 
Loan 
balances 
Specification Account FE  Account FE  Account FE Account FE Diffs in 
diffs(b) 
OLS OLS IV(d) 
Sample April 1999 
to October 
2000 
November 
1999 to 
May 2000 
Low 
savings(a) 
High 
savings 
TI KA vs. 
GE 
Capacity>0 All All 
Interest rate 
increase  
-373.3*** -198.1*** -331.0*** -169.6*** -250*** -400.6 -469.5 -555.7 
 (11.4) (11.8) (12.1) (35.5) (129) (14.7) (9.9) (13.1) 
Borrowing 
capacity(c) 
      0.2 0.44 
       (0.001) (0.011) 
Time in 
program 
50.8*** 64.1*** 54.5*** 30.9***  59.1 35.7  
 (0.8) (2.1) (1.4) (4.0)  (2.1) (0.8)  
         
Interest rate 
elasticity of 
borrowing 
-0.70 -0.37 -0.86 -0.26  -0.75 -0.88 -1.04 
F-stat in 
instrument 
       10.75 
Observations 53156 19719 31,291 20,318 6,243 36,231 68,037 68,037 
R-squared 0.73 0.87 0.69 0.78 0.25 0.68 0.78 0.78 
 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  All coefficients are statistically significant at 1 
percent. 
(a) Low-savings individuals are identified using savings balances between June to 
August 1999, and the subsequent responsiveness to the change in interest rate is 
measured using data from October 1999 on. 
(b) This is a triple-differences specification, looking at the change in Tikkapara and 
Kalyanpur in amount loaned to poor individuals after the interest rate change compared 
to before the interest rate change, relative to the same difference for rich individuals in 
Tikkapara and Kalyanpur, subtracting out the before-after rich-poor difference from 
Geneva. 
(c) Borrowing capacity uses program rules in conjunction with savings to determine the 
maximum amount an individual could borrow. 
(d) We instrument for borrowing capacity using time in program. 
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Table 4: Estimated Interest Rate Effects, 
Further Results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Outcome Takes a 
loan 
Amount 
borrowed 
Length of 
loan 
cycle 
Amount 
repaid 
Withdrawal 
from 
savings 
Deposit 
to 
savings 
Specification Linear 
probability 
model with  
account FE 
Account 
FE 
Account 
FE 
Account 
FE 
Account 
FE 
Account 
FE 
       
Interest rate  0.049*** -202.0*** -0.91*** 103.4*** 34.2* -4.59 
   increase (0.0088) (43.1) (0.064) (15.0) (19.6) (3.92) 
Time in 
program 
0.0017** 82.7*** 
0.24*** 
4.6*** 
7.01*** -1.29***
 (0.0007) (4.7) (0.007) (1.7) (1.59) (0.37) 
       
Observations 68,037 6,240 7,436 30,479 14625 49386 
R-squared 0.14 0.85 0.85 0.22 0.56 0.35 
Notes: All specifications contain month-year dummies.  
Standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; 
 
